Unfair Comparative Advantage

In the 1960s, Côte d'Ivoire was richer than South Korea. Comparative advantage explains why both boomed, and why only one kept going.

Cocoa and Clothes

Today, in economic terms, the gap between South Korea and Côte d'Ivoire is over an order of magnitude. Due to the differences between their Nominal GDP per capita, South Korea is considered a rich, developed nation, and Côte d'Ivoire is considered a lower-middle-income nation.[1]

But back in the 1960s, things were a bit different. BOTH South Korea and Côte d'Ivoire were booming in this period. In fact, Côte d'Ivoire was actually ahead. Its GDP per capita was higher than Korea's well into the late 1960s.[2, 3, 4]

Côte d'Ivoire was the richer of the two countries every year from 1960 to 1972. Korea only passes it in 1973.
Côte d'Ivoire was the richer of the two countries every year from 1960 to 1972. Korea only passed it in 1973.

The reason why this happened was simple: comparative advantage. For Côte d'Ivoire, planting cocoa and coffee involves using only a small portion of their total available labour,[5] and they have enough uncultivated land to produce commercial quantities of the crops. Being a tropical country, they can produce a ton of high-demand tropical cash crops for very little cost.[6]

Korea, on the other hand, has very little land, isn't a tropical country, and doesn't have a lot of institutions for cash crops. It, however, has a ton of cheap labour that can't be put to work in large plantations. So it produces cheap garments and wigs.[7]

The result was that both countries experienced an economic boom. Both had above 7% growth for most of the 1960s and 1970s.[8]

However, this parity didn't last long. Korea today is vastly richer than Côte d'Ivoire. By the mid 1960s, South Korea's growth had surpassed Côte d'Ivoire's,[8] and furthermore, commodity price crashes, combined with Volcker-era rate hikes, wiped out Côte d'Ivoire's boom for multiple decades,[9, 10] and crucially, they never managed to catch up to South Korea.[4]

The same two lines, run to 2024. Côte d'Ivoire's income per head peaked in 1978 and is still about 22% below that peak today.
The same two lines, run to 2024. Côte d'Ivoire's income per head peaked in 1978 and is still about 22% below that peak today.

Many factors have been proposed for why comparative advantage didn't save Côte d'Ivoire: corruption, the one-party state from 1960 to 1990, a coup in 1999, civil wars from 2002 to 2007 and 2010 to 2011, failure to reform, etc.[11, 12]

Cocoa peaked in 1977 at $8.29/kg in real terms and bottomed at $1.14 in 2000 — an 86% collapse. Côte d'Ivoire's income per head peaked in 1978, one year after the price did. The coup came in 1999 and the civil wars after 2002.
Cocoa peaked in 1977 at $8.29/kg in real terms and bottomed at $1.14 in 2000 — an 86% collapse. Côte d'Ivoire's income per head peaked in 1978, one year after the price did. The coup came in 1999, and the civil wars came after 2002.

While those are correct explanations, Côte d'Ivoire was doomed from the start. Even if they had a good government and no succession crises, they simply could not have done what Korea did. This is because their "Comparative Advantage" was not advantageous enough. Here's why.

Advantage is dynamic

Suppose it takes you 1 hour to write an article that makes you $100, and it takes you 3 hours to clean your room.

Now suppose that it takes me 5 hours to clean people's rooms for $100 but 10 hours to write an article that makes me $100.

What this means is that you're better than me at both writing valuable articles AND cleaning your room. Comparative Advantage is that even though this is true, you should still let me clean your room.[13]

Because suppose you have 10 hours in a day and you spend 3 hours of it on cleaning your room, you'll make $700. (For the sake of brevity, we'll assume you have no other human needs.) But if you spend all 10 hours, you'll make $1000.

Meanwhile, in the same 10 hours, I can write only 1 article, making $100. However, if I clean rooms for 10 hours, I'll make $200. You pay me $100 to clean your room, and you're left with $900, and I have $200 because I spent my time cleaning rooms instead of writing an article, with which I would have made $100. You make more, I make more, everyone's happy.

That's the story of Ricardian Comparative Advantage, and it's a great sell. But consider what's actually happening in my story... I'm a cleaner! Even though I make more money than I would have if I tried to write an article, I'm still a cleaner, and the amount of money I can make is fundamentally capped. If I charge more than $300, then you'll clean your room by yourself; I'll make zero money unless I go back to writing, and you still get to make $700!

Indeed, even if I could clean your room in 1 hour and I charged $100, if there is someone else who takes 5x more time, if they decide to undercut me by just $10, my entire speed advantage is entirely eroded. So what actually happens is I get in a race to the bottom, and because I'm already close to the bottom and what I'm doing is easy to replicate, I almost always end up near that bottom.[14, 15]

So while it's awesome for me to make the most money I could possibly make right now by just cleaning rooms, if I actually doubled down and cleaned rooms, I'm likely to never become as rich as you. Indeed, maybe I am actually better off going to write articles, losing 50% of my income today, so that maybe one day I can make what you make.

This relationship holds at the country level. The fundamental mechanism is basic supply and demand interacting with market structure. The fact is that you, the article writer, could also, theoretically, be undercut by someone who charges half as much as you do. But because there aren't that many great writers, the chances of that happening to you are low. Because I clean and many people can clean, it's more likely to happen to me. It's not always that individual situations can apply at the scale of nations, but as Prebisch and Singer each argued in 1950, it does apply.[14]

In other words, just because Comparative Advantage exists doesn't mean it's fair. Indeed, the advantage that any country has in any industry is multi-faceted and depends on many different properties. In 2007, the Norwegian economist Erik Reinert explored some of these properties and showed how they are unevenly distributed, which means that some countries can be structurally disadvantaged long term, even if their short term comparative advantage holds.[16]

Advantage is a Vector

Think about the following problem:

Company X produces 100 widgets at a profit margin of 30%. If they can buy a new shiny machine that produces 1000 widgets, they can make a bigger profit margin of 40% due to higher automation and capital intensity.

But the Market Company X operates in is only supporting the 30% margin on those widgets because there aren't enough of them. If Company X floods the market with ten times the amount of widgets, they'll be everywhere, and customers won't have to buy them at the same price to clear the market.

So Company X may not actually make that 40% margin because their actual price is set by the market according to the laws of supply and demand. In fact, in some cases they may actually make a smaller margin than they otherwise would have.

This is a basic returns problem. The question is, are there diminishing or increasing returns to scale? Does demand satiate at a price that maintains existing margins, lower margins but higher total revenue, or worse?

This is one of the problems that countries have. Some countries have increasing returns to scale. They can increase output significantly while maintaining or increasing profit margins. Think cars or precision equipment.[17] Some others have no such luxury. Think Cocoa or Oil, where a production glut of even a few percentage points can crash the price.[18, 19]

In the short run neither growers nor buyers can respond to price at all, so small changes in quantity clear only at very large changes in price.
In the short run, neither growers nor buyers can respond to price at all, so small changes in quantity clear only at very large changes in price.

From this, you can plausibly see how some countries can seemingly endlessly grow their economy while some others stagnate and run faster just to stay in the same place.

Take Côte d'Ivoire, for example, which by 2022 was using almost a third of its entire cultivated land area to grow cocoa. Clearly, they can't 10x their economy off of growing more Cocoa. They would run out of land![6, 20]

Ten-xing cocoa output at current yields would take more land than the country physically has. This is arithmetic, not rhetoric.
Ten-xing cocoa output at current yields would take more land than the country physically has. This is arithmetic, not rhetoric.

But that's not the only problem; really, there are four main questions to ask when trying to understand the advantage a nation actually has.

  1. Are there diminishing or increasing returns to what they are doing?
  2. Does the demand for what they are producing increase rapidly as the world gets richer?
  3. Based on the fact that they can produce this thing, what else can they produce? [21]
  4. How much of the value that they are producing stays inside the country?

In the next part, we'll dive deeper into these four questions. For now, we can walk away with a concise summary, which is that comparative advantage captures the advantage that a country has under a specific set of economic arrangements, and while it is immensely useful, countries must also think about their advantages over time and how easily the arrangements they find themselves in can change.

References

[1] World Bank, "GDP per capita (current US$)," https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD — Korea $36,239 and Côte d'Ivoire $2,710 in 2024, a ratio of ~13.4×.

World Bank, "Country Classifications by Income Level, FY2026," https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519 — Côte d'Ivoire lower-middle-income ($1,136–$4,495 GNI per capita); high-income threshold $13,935.

[2] World Bank, "GDP per capita (current US$) — Côte d'Ivoire and Korea, Rep., 1960–1977," https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?end=1977&locations=CI-KR&start=1960 — Côte d'Ivoire ahead 1961–1969; Korea passes it in 1970.

[3] Maddison Project Database 2023, via Our World in Data, "GDP per capita," https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/gdp-per-capita-maddison-project-database — crossover 1969 in PPP terms.

[4] World Bank, "GDP per capita (constant 2015 US$)," https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD?locations=CI-KR — crossover 1973; Côte d'Ivoire's per capita income fell 38% between 1980 and 1994, peaked in 1978 and has still not regained that peak (2024 remains ~22% below it), and sat below its own 1960 level from 2003 to 2011.

[5] Fairtrade International, "Living Income Reference Prices for Cocoa from Ghana & Côte d'Ivoire" (2026), https://www.fairtrade.net/content/dam/fairtrade/fairtrade-international/library/2026/west-africa-cocoa-living-income-reference-prices-2026/Living-income-reference-price-cocoa-ghana-cote-divoire-explanatory-note-2026.pdf — the average Ivorian cocoa household has ~614 available working-age labour days a year and spends 225 on cocoa, a 37% share (Ghana: 88 of 512, 18%).

International Cocoa Organization, "A Global Review of Cocoa Farming Systems," https://www.icco.org/wp-content/uploads/Global-Review-of-Cocoa-Farming-Systems_Final.pdf — citing an International Cocoa Initiative study: ~120 labour days per hectare per year, including household, hired and communal labour.

[6] Abu et al., "Detecting cocoa plantations in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana and their implications on protected areas," Ecological Indicators, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1470160X21005288; and Wikipedia, "Cocoa production in Ivory Coast," https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cocoa_production_in_Ivory_Coast — Côte d'Ivoire expanded onto 3.7–4.8 million hectares of largely forest land and overtook Ghana as the world's largest cocoa producer in 1977–78.

[7] Castley, R. J., "Korea's Export Growth: An Alternative Explanation," University of Manchester Global Development Institute, https://hummedia.manchester.ac.uk/institutes/gdi/publications/workingpapers/depp/dp_wp43.pdf — the government had not foreseen "the rapid growth of the plywood and wigs industries which along with clothing were to constitute the 'big three' in Korea's exports in the mid 1960s."

IMF, "Korea's Export Success, 1960–69," Finance & Development 8, no. 1 (1971), https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/022/0008/001/article-A003-en.xml — Korea began exporting wigs in 1964.

[8] World Bank, "GDP growth (annual %)," https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=CI-KR — Côte d'Ivoire averaged 8.7% (1961–69) and 7.6% (1970–79); Korea averaged 9.5% and 10.6%. From 1965 onward, Korea's annual growth exceeded Côte d'Ivoire's in every year but 1970 and 1975, leading in 15 of the 20 years to 1980.

[9] Crook, R. C., "Politics, the Cocoa Crisis, and Administration in Côte d'Ivoire," Journal of Modern African Studies, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/abs/politics-the-cocoa-crisis-and-administration-in-cote-divoire/5E02DEAC117B47DDA451EF97219F581E — Richard C. Crook, JMAS, December 1990. Cocoa fell from a 1977 peak of £3,500/ton to £670–750 in the 1989–90 season, roughly 25% of its 1977–78 value in real dollars.

[10] UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, "The End of the Golden Age, the Debt Crisis and Development Setbacks," World Economic and Social Survey 2017, ch. 3, https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/WESS_2017_ch3.pdf — US short-term rates rose from 9½% in August 1979 to over 16% by May 1981, striking floating-rate developing-country debt.

Simson, R., "Lost Decades," African Economic History Network, https://www.aehnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/19_Textbook_Lost-decades_RSimson_V5_Final.pdf — names Côte d'Ivoire among the cocoa producers that rode the 1974 and 1977 price spikes into mounting debt burdens.

[11] Britannica, "Côte d'Ivoire since independence," https://www.britannica.com/place/Cote-dIvoire/Cote-dIvoire-since-independence

[12] Wikipedia, "History of Ivory Coast (1960–99)," https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Ivory_Coast_(1960%E2%80%9399) — the PDCI was the sole legal party from 1960 to 1990; Houphouët-Boigny ruled until his death in 1993; the coup came in December 1999 and the civil wars in 2002–07 and 2010–11.

[13] Ricardo, David, On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817), ch. 7, "On Foreign Trade," https://www.econlib.org/library/Ricardo/ricP.html — the original statement of comparative advantage that this toy model reproduces.

[14] Prebisch, Raúl, The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems (UN ECLA, 1950); Singer, Hans W., "The Distribution of Gains between Investing and Borrowing Countries," American Economic Review 40, no. 2 (1950). See Toye, J. and Toye, R., "The Origins and Interpretation of the Prebisch-Singer Thesis," https://johntoyedotnet.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/theoriginsandinterpretationoftheprebischsingerthesis2003.pdf — gains from technical progress in primary production pass to consumers as lower prices, while gains in manufacturing are retained by producers as higher incomes.

[15] Harvey, D. I., Kellard, N. M., Madsen, J. B. and Wohar, M. E., "The Prebisch-Singer Hypothesis: Four Centuries of Evidence," Review of Economics and Statistics 92, no. 2 (2010): 367–377, https://direct.mit.edu/rest/article-abstract/92/2/367/58586/ — 11 of 25 commodity series show a significant downward trend over all or part of the sample; note the published erratum correcting data-construction errors. Compare Arezki, R., Hadri, K., Loungani, P. and Rao, Y., "Testing the Prebisch-Singer Hypothesis since 1650," IMF Working Paper 13/180 (2013), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp13180.pdf — results "mixed but with a majority of series showing negative trends." Also Cline, William R., "Can the East Asian Model of Development Be Generalized?," World Development 10, no. 2 (1982) — the adding-up / fallacy-of-composition problem.

[16] Reinert, Erik S., How Rich Countries Got Rich … and Why Poor Countries Stay Poor (2007), https://www.hachette.co.uk/titles/erik-s-reinert/how-rich-countries-got-rich-and-why-poor-countries-stay-poor/9781845298746/ — poor countries specialise in activities that are subject to diminishing returns, are devoid of learning potential, and/or whose fruits of learning "are passed on to their customers in the rich countries in the form of lower prices."

Ocampo, José Antonio, ed., Neostructuralism and Heterodox Thinking in Latin America and the Caribbean in the Early Twenty-First Century (ECLAC), https://www.cepal.org/en/publications/40121-neostructuralism-and-heterodox-thinking-latin-america-and-caribbean-early-twenty — structural heterogeneity and core-periphery power relations as persistent structural obstacles to development.

[17] Magacho, G. R. and McCombie, J. S. L., "Verdoorn's Law and Productivity Dynamics: An Empirical Investigation into the Demand and Supply Approaches," University of Cambridge, https://api.repository.cam.ac.uk/server/api/core/bitstreams/84a3ff2e-a947-4776-9594-cdaa812b9bd8/content; and Angeriz, A., McCombie, J. and Roberts, M., "New Estimates of Returns to Scale and Spatial Spillovers for EU Regional Manufacturing, 1986–2002," International Regional Science Review 31, no. 1 (2008) — increasing returns in manufacturing is the Kaldor–Verdoorn regularity.

[18] Tothmihaly, A., "How low is the price elasticity in the global cocoa market?," African Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 13, no. 3: 209–223, https://afjare.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/2.-Tothmihaly.pdf — "the global cocoa supply is extremely price-inelastic: the corresponding short- and long-run estimates are 0.07 and 0.57 respectively. The price elasticity of cocoa demand also falls into the extremely inelastic range: the short- and long-run estimates are -0.06 and -0.34 respectively." Annual global data, 1963–2013.

[19] Caldara, D., Cavallo, M. and Iacoviello, M., "Oil Price Elasticities and Oil Price Fluctuations," Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, International Finance Discussion Paper 1173, https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/ifdp/2016/files/ifdp1173.pdf — "An unanticipated disruption in oil supply reduces production by about 0.75 percent and elicits a persistent increase in oil prices, which rise by 6 percent on impact and remain elevated thereafter."

[20] World Bank, "Land area (sq. km) — Cote d'Ivoire," AG.LND.TOTL.K2, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.LND.TOTL.K2?locations=CI — 318,000 km² (31.8 million hectares); permanent cropland 28.1% of land area (AG.LND.CROP.ZS).

[21] Hidalgo, C. A., Klinger, B., Barabási, A.-L. and Hausmann, R., "The Product Space Conditions the Development of Nations," Science (2007); and Hidalgo, C. A. and Hausmann, R., "The Building Blocks of Economic Complexity," PNAS 106, no. 26 (2009): 10570–10575, https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.0900943106 — what a country can produce next is conditioned by the capabilities embedded in what it already exports.

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